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Abstract
We introduce an algebraic approach to Dynamic Epistemic Logic. This approach has the advan-
tage that: (i) its semantics is a transparent algebraic object with a minimal set of primitives from
which most ingredients of Dynamic Epistemic Logic arise, (ii) it goes with the introduction of
non-determinism, (iii) it naturally extends beyond boolean sets of propositions, up to intuition-
istic and non-distributive situations, hence allowing to accommodate constructive computational,
information-theoretic as well as non-classical physical settings, and (iv) introduces a structure on
the actions, which now constitute a quantale. We also introduce a corresponding sequent calcu-
lus (which extends Lambek calculus), in which propositions, actions as well as agents appear as
resources in a resource-sensitive dynamic-epistemic logic.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is a PDL-style logic to reason about epistemic
actions and updates in a multi-agent system. It focuses in particular on epis-
temic programs, i.e. programs that update the information state of agents,
and it has applications to modelling and reasoning about information-ﬂow
and information exchange between agents. This is a major problem in several
ﬁelds such as secure communication where one has to deal with the privacy
and authentication of communication protocols, Artiﬁcial Intelligence where
agents are to be provided with reliable tools to reason about their environ-
ment and each other’s knowledge, and e-commerce where agents need to have
knowledge acquisition strategies over complex networks.
The standard approach to information ﬂow in a multi-agent system has
been presented in [9] but it does not present a formal description of epistemic
programs and their updates. The ﬁrst attempts to formalize such programs
and updates were done by Plaza [22], Gerbrandy and Groeneveld [13], and
Gerbrandy [11,12]. However, they only studied a restricted class of epistemic
programs. A general notion of epistemic programs and updates for DEL was
introduced in [4,5]. However, in this approach the underlying logic on propo-
sitions is boolean. For computational purposes one might want to relax this
to an intuitionistic setting, hence conceiving propositions as being structured
in a Heyting algebra. On the other hand, continuous lattices are also models
of partiality of knowledge [10], and are in general not distributive. Finally, ac-
tual physical computational situations such as quantum computation require
(at least) a non-boolean setting.
In this paper we generalize ‘boolean’ DEL by introducing the notion of
an abstract epistemic system. This generalization goes hand-in-hand with the
introduction of non-determinism for states and actions and brings algebraic
clarity to the semantics. The particular algebraic object which we introduce
is a reﬁnement of previously used objects tailored to study concurrency in
computer science [1,23] and the dynamics and interaction of physical systems
[7]. Such an abstract epistemic system consists of a quantale Q of epistemic
programs, a Q-right module M of epistemic propositions, and each agent is
encoded by an appearance map i.e. an endomorphism of the (M,Q)-structure.
We show that the boolean DEL of [5] is a concrete example of such an abstract
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epistemic system. The axioms of the modal operators follow immediately from
abstract properties of quantales and modules over them. Crucial notions of
DEL are deﬁnable abstractly and some new notions emerge naturally. The
passage to a non-boolean theory also provides a new insight into epistemic
programs such as public announcement and, of a surprisingly diﬀerent status,
public refutation. We sketch an analysis of the muddy children puzzle and of a
cryptographic attack in our setting and also provide a motivating example for
the passage to a non-boolean theory. We also provide a corresponding sequent
calculus in which sequents will typically look like
m1, . . . , q1, . . . , A1, . . . , mk, . . . , ql, . . . , An  δ
where m1, . . . , mk are propositions, q1, . . . , ql are actions and A1, . . . An are
agents which resolve into a single proposition or action δ. The fragment of
the calculus restricted to actions is the Lambek calculus [19], hence resource
sensitive.
2 Epistemic propositions and epistemic programs
In this section we slightly recast and enrich the Dynamic Epistemic Logic of
[5] in such a way that it enables a smooth passage to the algebraic setting
to be introduced in Section 4. Part of this involves the introduction of non-
determinism for both states and actions.
State models.
For a set of facts Φ and a ﬁnite set of agents A, a state model is a triple
S = (S,
A
→, µ)A∈A
where S is the set of states,
A
→⊆ S × S the accessibility relation for each
agent A ∈ A, and µ : S → P(Φ) the valuation map which encodes satisfaction
s |= ϕ ⇔ ϕ ∈ µ(s). The “facts” ϕ ∈ Φ are simple, objectives features of
the world (“objective” in the sense of non-epistemic, i.e. independent of the
agents’ knowledge or beliefs), and the valuation map tell us what facts hold
in a given state s ∈ S. Each accessibility relation can be repackaged as a map
fA : S → P(S) :: s → fA(s) := {t ∈ S | s
A
→ t} ,
called the appearance map of agent A. The signiﬁcance of the appearance maps
is as follows: if t ∈ fA(s) then, whenever agent A is in state s he considers
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state t as a ‘possible world’. In other words, if the actual state of the system
is s, agent A thinks t may be the actual state.
As an example, 5 consider two players A,B and a referee C. In front of
everybody, the referee throws a fair coin, catches it in his palm and fully
covers it, before anybody (including himself) can see on which side the coin
has landed. There are two possible states here, state s in which ‘the coin lies
Heads’ up (= H ∈ Φ), hence µ(s) = {H}, and state t in which the coin lies
Tails up (= T ∈ Φ), hence µ(t) = {T}. We depict the state model Toss as
s:H
A,B,C


A,B,C
 t:T
A,B,C

.
For every agent there are arrows between any two states (including identical
states), which means that nobody knows the ‘real state’.
We can also consider a case in which agents B and C can see the face of
the coin, but agent A cannot see it (although he knows that the others see
it), so he is still uncertain if the coin is heads or tails. In this case only agent
A has several arrows between states whereas agents B and C have only one
arrow in each state, which means that if the coin is heads up they know it and
similarly for tails up. Hence PToss gets depicted as
s′:H
A,B,C


A
 t′:T
A,B,C

.
An epistemic proposition P over a state model S is a subset P of S, containing
all the states at which the proposition is ‘true’. The maps µ and fA of the
state model are extended to elements of P as follows
µ(P ) :=
⋂
{µ(s) | s ∈ P} ∈ P(Φ) fA(P ) :=
⋃
{fA(s) | s ∈ P} ∈ P(S) .
Note that we have to use intersection and not union in deﬁning µ(P ) since a
fact is entailed by an epistemic proposition when it holds at all the states of
the proposition. This makes the passage from P(S) to P(Φ) contravariant.
In other words, the actual algebra of facts is P(Φ)op, that is, the complete
boolean algebra P(Φ) where the order is reversed i.e. ϕ1 ≤
op ϕ2 ⇔ ϕ1 ⊇
ϕ2. While facts are simple and non-epistemic, and thus cannot be altered by
epistemic actions (see further), epistemic propositions can express complex
features of the world, which may depend on the agents’ knowledge (and so
may be changed by epistemic actions). However, notice that each fact ϕ ∈ Φ
5 For a more elaborated example of an authentication protocol we refer the reader to [2].
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corresponds to an epistemic proposition Pϕ := {s ∈ S | ϕ ∈ µ(s)}, saying that
the fact holds in the current state.
In the Toss model, H and T are facts expressing the heads up or tails up
of the coin. The epistemic propositions that correspond to these facts are the
states in which the fact holds. The epistemic propositions are ∅, {s}, {t}, {s, t} ⊆
{s, t}. We depict an epistemic proposition over a state model by double-
circling the included states, hence
s:H
A,B,C


A,B,C
 t:T
A,B,C

	
s:H
A,B,C


A,B,C
 t:T
A,B,C

s:H
A,B,C


A,B,C
 	
t:T
A,B,C

	
s:H
A,B,C


A,B,C
 	
t:T
A,B,C

represent the four epistemic propositions of Toss.
When a proposition P has exactly one state s ∈ P (i.e. P = {s} is a
singleton), we shall use systematic ambiguity, identifying the proposition with
the state and writing e.g. P = {P}.
Action models.
Given a state model S, an action model over S is a triple∑
= (Σ,
A
→, µ)A∈A
similar to a state model except that we think of the elements of Σ as possible
actions instead of possible states and the valuation µ : Σ → P(S) assigns to
each action σ a precondition, i.e. a proposition µ(σ) deﬁnining the domain of
applicability of σ: action σ can happen in a state s iﬀ s ∈ µ(σ) ; e.g. a truthful
announcement of a fact can only happen in those states where that fact holds.
Note that since P(S) is boolean we can equivalently consider the states at
which the action cannot take place . These states, which are the complements
of the precondition of an action are denoted as Ker(σ) := S \ µ(σ) for each
σ ∈ Σ. The eﬀect of an action on states and appearance maps will be deﬁned
below in terms of an epistemic update product.
We introduce an action model over Toss. After catching the coin in his
hand the referee might secretly take a peek at the coin before covering it while
nobody notices this. The action model is now depicted as
σ
C
 A,B
  τ
A,B,C

where σ stands for ‘cheating’ and τ for ‘nothing happens’ and µ(σ) = {s, t}.
The action model can be reﬁned when replacing σ by σH and σT where
µ(σH) = {s} and µ(σT ) = {t}, specifying what the referee saw in case of
deceit. Pictorially
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!"#$%&'(σH
C

A,B
  τ A,B,C
!"#$%&'(σT C

A,B
		
An epistemic program π over an action model Σ is a subset π of Σ; the µ and
fA maps are both extended covariantly by continuity
µ(π) :=
⋃
{µ(σ) | σ ∈ π} ∈ P(S) and fA(π) :=
⋃
{fA(σ) | σ ∈ π} ∈ P(Σ) .
The union in the deﬁnition of µ maps for programs says that an epistemic
program is applicable where at least one of its actions is applicable. This
makes the Ker map follow contravariantly by boolean negation i.e. Ker(π) :=
S \ µ(π) or equivalently Ker(π) :=
⋂
{Ker(σ) | σ ∈ π}. Epistemic programs
introduce non-determinism: whenever π1 ⊆ π2 then π2 is obtained from π1 by
increasing nondeterminism; π = {σ1, σ2} stands for “either action σ1 or action
σ2 takes place”.
In our example with actions σH , σT and τ the epistemic program {σH , σT}
stands for the non-deterministic action σ, in the sense that the outcome of the
toss can be either. We depict the program over an action by double-circling
the including actions. Hence the picture of the program π = {σH , σT} over∑
is
!"#$%&'(σH
C

A,B
  τ A,B,C
!"#$%&'(σT C

A,B
		
As in the case of states and propositions, we use systematic ambiguity to
identify deterministic programs π = {σ} with their unique underlying action
σ.
Update.
Given a state model S and an action model
∑
over S we deﬁne their update
product S⊗
∑
to be a new state model given by
S⊗Σ :=
⋃
σ∈Σ
µ(σ)×{σ} fA(s, σ) := (fA(s)×fA(σ))∩ (S⊗Σ) µ(s, σ) := µ(s) .
In simpler terms we have S⊗Σ = {(s, σ) | s ∈ µ(σ), σ ∈ Σ} ⊆ S×Σ and also
fA(s, σ) ⊆ fA(s)×fA(σ) that is (s
′, σ′) ∈ fA(s, σ) iﬀ s
′ ∈ fA(s) and σ
′ ∈ fA(σ).
As it will become more explicit in the abstract algebra of next section, update
is a structure preserving operation in the sense that it has no side eﬀect on
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the state model that it acts on. In our example, after the cheating action
σH where the coin has lied Heads up, A and B think that nobody knows on
which side the coin is lying. But they are wrong! The system after this action
can be updated by taking the update product of the two models Toss and σH
depicted above:
s,σH
C



A,B

A,B









s, τ
A,B,C


A,B,C
 t, τ
A,B,C

Note that in general S ⊗ Σ and S are not necessarily disjoint. 6
Deﬁnition 2.1 We deﬁne the update product of an epistemic proposition P
over S and an epistemic program π over
∑
as the epistemic proposition
P ⊗ π :=
⋃
σ∈π
(µ(σ) ∩ P )× {σ} ⊆ P × π over S⊗
∑
.
The proposition P ⊗ π provides the strongest postcondition for P with
respect to epistemic program π. This means that if proposition P is true at
the input of program π then P ⊗π is the strongest proposition that is true at
the output of π. It can be seen that P ⊗ π = ∅ iﬀ P ∩ µ(π) = ∅, where ∅ is
the falsum (i.e. the trivially false epistemic proposition over S).
Modalities.
We deﬁne the epistemic modality for each agent A ∈ A as the unary
connective which assigns to proposition P ⊆ S over S another proposition
AP :=
{
s ∈ S
∣∣ fA(s) ⊆ P} over S.
We read AP as ‘agent A knows or believes P ’.
7
We deﬁne the dynamic modality for each epistemic program π over
∑
as the unary connective which assigns to proposition P ⊆ S over S another
proposition
[π]P :=
{
s ∈ S
∣∣ {s} ⊗ π ⊆ P} =⋃{Q ∈ P(S) ∣∣ Q⊗ π ⊆ P} over S .
6 In fact later, the most important models we shall consider later (DEL models) are closed
with respect to update product, i.e. S ⊗ Σ ⊆ S.
7 Taking either ‘knows’ or ‘beliefs’ depends on the context.
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Note that (as mentioned before) some states s ∈ S can be themselves pairs
of states and actions (s, σ) which make the above deﬁnition well deﬁned. The
proposition [π]P provides the weakest precondition for P with respect to the
epistemic program π. This means that if proposition P is true at the output
of program π then [π]P is the weakest proposition that should have been true
before π.
Sequential composition.
The sequential composition
∑
1 •
∑
2 over S of two action models
∑
1 and∑
2 both over S means ‘ﬁrst do
∑
1 and then do
∑
2’ and is deﬁned as
Σ1•Σ2 := Σ1×Σ2 fA(σ1, σ2) := fA(σ1)×fA(σ2) µ(σ1, σ2) := µ(σ1)∩[σ1]µ(σ2).
In simpler terms, (σ′1, σ
′
2) ∈ fA(σ1, σ2) iﬀ σ
′
1 ∈ fA(σ1) and σ
′
2 ∈ fA(σ2) and
also µ(σ1, σ2) = {s ∈ S | s ∈ µ(σ1), s⊗ σ1 ∈ µ(σ2)}. Again note that Σ1 • Σ2
and Σ1 (or Σ2) are not necessarily disjoint.
8 The action model over a state
model S contains an action skip in which nothing happens iﬀ 9
skip = {skip} µskip = S = P (S) fA(skip) = {skip} .
Notice the use of systematic ambiguity: we denoted with the same name (skip
) both the program skip and its only action. It is easy to see that skip is a
unit, up to isomorphism, both for update product and sequential composition.
Deﬁnition 2.2 We deﬁne the sequential composition of two epistemic pro-
grams π1 over
∑
1 and π2 over
∑
2 as the epistemic proposition π1•π2 := π1×π2
over
∑
1 •
∑
2.
Concrete epistemic systems.
We now have all the tools to make the passage of DEL in the sense of
[5] to ‘concrete epistemic systems’ which we put forward as a stepping-stone
towards ‘abstract epistemic systems’. A DEL model is essentially one that is
closed under update product and sequential composition (and contains a skip),
while a concrete epistemic system consists of all the epistemic propositions and
all the epistemic programs of a DEL model:
Deﬁnition 2.3 A DEL model is a pair (S,
∑
) where S is a state model and∑
is an action model over S such that skip ∈ Σ, (S⊗Σ) ⊆ S and (Σ•Σ) ⊆ Σ.
Deﬁnition 2.4 Given a DEL model (S,
∑
), a concrete epistemic system is the
pair (P(S),P(Σ)) which goes equipped with valuation µ, appearance maps
8 In fact later we only consider models where Σ • Σ ⊆ Σ.
9 This action has been denoted as τ in the preceding examples.
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{fA}A∈A and all other operations of the DEL model extended to P(S) and
P(Σ) as we showed before.
3 The algebra of programs and propositions
A sup-lattice L is a complete lattice with maps which preserve arbitrary joins as
homomorphism. Recall that each sup-lattice also has arbitrary meets, namely∧
i
ai =
∨
{b ∈ L | ∀i, b ≤ ai}
for any A ⊆ L. Hence the designation ‘sup-lattice refers to the fact that
we require structure-preserving maps only to preserve arbitrary joins (cf. the
designations locales and frames for complete Heyting algebras [17]). We denote
bottom and top of L by ⊥ and  respectively and deﬁne its set of atoms as
Atm(L) := {p ∈ L \ {⊥} | a ≤ p ⇒ a = ⊥}.
A lattice L is atomistic iﬀ
∀a ∈ L, a =
∨
{p ∈ Atm(L) | p ≤ a} .
Every sup-morphism f ∗ : L → M has a (unique) right Galois adjoint f∗
satisfying
f ∗(a) ≤ b
a ≤ f∗(b)
and can be explicitly given as
f∗ : M → L :: b →
∨
{a ∈ L | f ∗(a) ≤ b}.
The left Galois adjoint f ∗ moreover preserves arbitrary meets. We denote
an adjoint pair by f ∗  f∗. In computational terms, one can think of the
left Galois adjoint f∗ as assigning weakest preconditions with respect to the
program f ∗.
A quantale 10 is a sup-lattice Q equipped with a monoid structure (Q, •, 1)
satisfying
a •
(∨
i
bi
)
=
∨
i
(a • bi)
(∨
i
ai
)
• b =
∨
i
(ai • b) .
10 The term ‘quantale’ was introduced in [21]. For a survey on quantales we refer to [24].
For insightful categorical perspectives on quantales and Q-modules we refer to [18] and [25].
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Hence for all a ∈ Q the maps a • − : Q → Q and − • a : Q → Q preserve
arbitrary joins and hence they have Galois adjoints (a • −)  (a \ −) and
(− • a)  (−/a) explicitly given by
a \ b :=
∨
{c ∈ Q | a • c ≤ b} b/a :=
∨
{c ∈ Q | c • a ≤ b}.
We refer to (a\−) and (−/a) as the residual operations. A quantale homomor-
phism is both a sup-homomorphism and a monoid-homomorphism. Examples
of quantales are: the set sup(L) of all sup-endomorphisms of a complete lattice
L ordered pointwisely; the set of all relations from a set X to itself ordered by
pointwise inclusion — this quantale is isomorphic to sup(P(X)); the powerset
of any monoid with composition extended by continuity.
A Q-right module for a quantale Q is a sup-lattice M which goes equipped
with a module action −⊗− : M ×Q → M , that is,
m⊗ 1 = m
m⊗ (q1 • q2) = (m⊗ q1)⊗ q2
m⊗ (
∨
i
qi) =
∨
i
(m⊗ qi) (
∨
i
mi)⊗ q =
∨
i
(mi ⊗ q)
Again we have two right Galois adjoints − ⊗ q  [q]− and m ⊗ −  {m}−
where
[q]m :=
∨
{m′ ∈ M | m′⊗q ≤ m} {m}m′ :=
∨
{q ∈ Q | m⊗q ≤ m′}.
As for some examples, a quantale Q is a Q-right module over itself with
composition as the tensor and a complete lattice L is a sup(L)-right module
with function application as the tensor.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A system is a pair (M,Q) with Q a quantale and M a Q-right
module [1].
A system is atomistic when both M and Q are atomistic and the following
equations hold
m ∈ Atm(M), q ∈ Atm(Q) =⇒m⊗ q ∈ Atm(M) ∪ {⊥}
q1, q2 ∈ Atm(Q) =⇒ q1 • q2 ∈ Atm(Q) .
These conditions can be interpreted as the fact that ‘the atoms of both the
quantale and the module behave deterministically’.
Proposition 3.2 i. Epistemic programs P(Σ) with
⋃
as
∨
, sequential com-
position as • and ‘skip’ as 1 form a quantale. 11 ii. Epistemic propositions
11 This construction is implicit in the relational composition of dynamic actions in [15].
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P(S) with
⋃
as
∨
and update product as ⊗ form a right P(Σ)-module 12 .
iii. The pair (P(S),P(Σ)) is an atomistic system. The atoms of the module
P(S) correspond to the states s ∈ S, while the atoms of the quantale P(Σ)
correspond to the actions σ ∈ Σ.
Proposition 3.3 i. The appearance maps fA : P(S) → P(S), and for all
π ∈ Σ the maps − ⊗ π : P(S) → P(S) are all sup-homomorphisms. ii. The
appearance maps fA : P(Σ) → P(Σ), and for all π ∈ Σ the maps π • −,− •
π : P(Σ) → P(Σ) are quantale-homomorphisms. iii. For every epistemic
proposition P ∈ P(S) and every epistemic program π ∈ P(Σ), we have
fA(P ⊗ π) ⊆ fA(P )⊗ fA(π) .
iv. For every state (i.e. atomic proposition) s ∈ S and every action (i.e.
atomic program) σ ∈ Σ we have that:
if s⊗ σ = ∅ then fA(s⊗ σ) = fA(s)⊗ fA(σ) .
The last property can be generalised by introducing a notion of coherence:
Deﬁnition 3.4 A pair (P, π) where P is an epistemic proposition and π is
an epistemic program is coherent iﬀ
∀s ∈ P, ∀σ ∈ π s⊗ σ = ∅
i.e. iﬀ P ⊆ µ(σ) for every σ ∈ π. This means that proposition P ensures the
possibility of all the actions subsumed by program π. An equivalent deﬁnition
which doesn’t refer to states or actions is the following:
∀P ′ ⊆ P, ∀π′ ⊆ π (P ′ ⊗ π′ = ∅ ⇒ P ′ = ∅ or π′ = ∅) .
Proposition 3.5 If (P, π) is a coherent pair then we have
fA(P ⊗ π) = fA(P )⊗ fA(π) .
Proposition 3.6 i. For A ∈ A the right Galois adjoint to appearance fSA(−) :
P(S) → P(S) is knowledge SA− (=the epistemic modality). ii. For π ∈
P(Σ) the right Galois adjoint to update −⊗ π : P(S) → P(S) is the dynamic
modality [π]−. iii. The right Galois adjoint to appearance fΣA (−) : P(Σ) →
P(Σ) introduces an epistemic modality ΣA− on actions. iv. The right Galois
adjoint to left- and right-composition π • −,− • π : P(Σ) → P(Σ) introduce
respectively weakest pre-speciﬁcation π\− and strongest post-speciﬁcation π/−,
12 By this construction it becomes clear that update is a structure preserving map on epis-
temic propositions and has no side eﬀects.
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and the right Galois adjoint to P ⊗ − : P(Σ) → P(S) introduces {m}−, a
variant on this. 13
Proof. All follows by construction and basic facts on sets, cartesian products
and relations. 
4 Abstract epistemic systems
The propositions of the previous section lead us to the following deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition 4.1 A system-endomorphism (M,Q)
f
→ (M,Q) is a pair(
fM : M → M , fQ : Q → Q
)
where fM is a sup-homomorphism, fQ is a quantale homomorphism and
fM(m⊗ q) ≤ fM(m)⊗ fQ(q) (1)
for all m ∈ M and q ∈ Q.
Deﬁnition 4.2 An (abstract) epistemic system is a tuple (M,Q, {fA}A∈A)
where (M,Q) is a system and {fA}A∈A are system-endomorphisms.
Interpretation.
The elements of the quantale Q are to be thought of as the epistemic pro-
grams and its unit as skip, the elements of the module M are to be thought of
as the epistemic propositions, or if one wants, the not necessarily deterministic
states, the labels A ∈ A are the agents with the endomorphisms {fA}A∈A as
their appearance maps. The kernel of a program q ∈ Q is
Ker(q) := {m ∈ M | m⊗ q = ⊥}
and comprises the preconditions: it contains the epistemic propositions to
which q cannot be applied. The stabilizer
Stab(Q) := {m ∈ M | ∀q ∈ Q, [q]m = m}
13 The residual π \ − assigns to its argument δ the weakest program π \ δ which one has to
eﬀectuate after eﬀectuating π such that the net eﬀect is below δ. The residual −/π assigns
to its argument δ the strongest program δ/π which one has to eﬀectuate before eﬀectuating
π such that the net eﬀect is below δ. The right Galois adjoint does {m}− assigns to its
argument δ the weakest proposition {m}P before eﬀectuating π which guarantees P after.
For a discussion on pre- and post-speciﬁcation we refer to [8,16].
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comprises the facts: it consists of those epistemic propositions which are stable
under epistemic actions. The satisfaction relation is included in the partial
ordering of M : for a state m ∈ M and fact ϕ ∈ Stab(Q) we have m |=
ϕ ⇔ m ≤ ϕ. All modalities and other right Galois adjoints discussed and
introduced in Proposition 3.6 arise also here as right Galois adjoints and hence
their interpretation still holds e.g. “knowledge MA is the adjoint to appearance
fMA ”.
Nature of the modalities.
We identify the basic properties of the modalities.
Proposition 4.3 In any epistemic system we have

M
A  =  
M
A (m ∧m
′) = MA m ∧
M
A m
′ m ≤ m
′
MA m ≤ 
M
A m
′
.
Proof: Since MA is a right Galois adjoint it preserves arbitrary meets, that
is MA (
∧
i mi) =
∧
i
M
A mi, and hence it preserves the empty meet and binary
meets, and is monotone. 
Since all other modalities preserve arbitrary meets the same result holds
for them and for all other right Galois adjoints. In an intuitionistic context
where one might take M to be a frame (i.e. a (complete) Heyting algebra with
sup-homomorphisms) we can internalize the partial order using the deﬁning
property of a Heyting algebra so we obtain
 m → m′
 MA m → 
M
A m
′
.
Hence in the special case that Q = {1} and A = {∗} we obtain the intu-
itionistic modal logic IntK of [27]. We conclude that intuitionistic epistemic
systems, that is epistemic systems for which M is a frame, generalize intu-
itionistic modal logic to multiple agents and dynamics in terms of epistemic
programs. If M is moreover a complete boolean algebra such as the powerset
of Section 2 then Kripke’s axiom K follows i.e.

M
A (m → m
′) → (MA m → 
M
A m
′).
Diamonds and corresponding rules arise in that case by duality.
Learning.
The fact that eq(1) in deﬁnition 4.1 is an inequality expresses learning
of agents. Some of the clauses of the appearance of an agent on an update
A. Baltag et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 126 (2005) 27–52 39
product might get eliminated from the left hand side of eq(1) simply because
some of the sub-action of the program might not be applicable on some of the
sub-states of the proposition. This implies that the agent learns something
new as the result of update (left hand side is stronger than the right hand
side).
We can also force the equality by introducing the notion of coherence:
Deﬁnition 4.4 A pair (m, q) where m ∈ M and q ∈ Q is coherent iﬀ
∀m′ ≤ m, ∀q′ ≤ q (m′ ⊗ q′ = ⊥ ⇒ m′ = ⊥ or q′ = ⊥)
For example in an atomistic system, every atomic pair (m, q) ∈ Atm(M) ×
Atm(Q) where m /∈ ker(q) is coherent.
Deﬁnition 4.5 A strong epistemic system is a tuple (M,Q, {fA}A∈A) where
(M,Q) is a system and for all coherent pairs (m, q) we have the following
equality
fM(m⊗ q) = fM(m)⊗ fQ(q) .
Representation Theorems.
Theorem 4.6 Every atomistic strong epistemic system for which both M and
Q are completely distributive boolean algebras can be represented as a concrete
epistemic system.
Proof: It suﬃces to set S := Atm(M), Σ := Atm(Q) and Φ := Stab(Q). The
accessibility relations arise from the appearance maps, satisfaction from ϕ ∈
µ(s) ⇔ s ≤ ϕ for s ∈ S and ϕ ∈ Φ and preconditions from µ(σ) := S \Ker(σ)
for σ ∈ Σ. 
Theorem 4.7 Every concrete epistemic system (P(S),P(Σ)) is an atomistic
strong (abstract) epistemic system (M,Q, {fA}A∈A) .
Proof: By propositions 3.2, 3.3, and 3.5. 
5 Some dynamic epistemic situations
For a given epistemic system (M,Q, fA)A∈A the following are some examples
of some special epistemic programs that can be deﬁned in the system. Note
that Ker(q) =↓ (
∨
Ker(q)), where ↓ a := {b ∈ L | b ≤ a}, and hence “being
not in the precondition of q” exists as a proposition in M for all q ∈ Q.
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(i) Public refutation of the proposition m ∈ M is an epistemic program
q ∈ Q with {fA(q)}A∈A = q and Ker(q) =↓m. We depict it as
)*+,-./0q
A∈A

(ii) Private refutation to subgroup This is also a program that privately
refutes a proposition m to the subgroup β of agents. Ker(q) is the same
as before and {fA(q)}A∈β = q and {fA(q)}A∈A\β = 1. It is depicted as
)*+,-./0q
A∈β
 A/∈β
1
A∈A

(iii) Failure test of a proposition m is a program q that tests when m fails.
It is a particular case of private refutation where m is refuted to an empty
set of agents Ker(q) =↓m and {fA(q)}A∈A = 1. Pictorially
)*+,-./0q
A∈A
1
A∈A

(iv) Public announcement is also deﬁnable in our setting. However, while
“being not in the precondition of q” is a proposition in M for all q ∈
Q, this is not the case for “being in the precondition of q”. To see
this consider the lattice {⊥ ≤ a, b, c ≤ } with q such that Ker(q) =
{⊥, a} where in the language of Section 2 we have µ(q) = {b, c}, which
can not be represented by a single element of M . The reason for this
is that this lattice is non-boolean. Hence public announcement of the
proposition m ∈ M is an epistemic program q ∈ Q for which fA(q) = q
and for which
∨
Ker(q) has a boolean complement (
∨
Ker(q))c, satisfying
(
∨
Ker(q))c = m.
We now present some case studies. Given an epistemic system (M,Q, fA)A∈A
on which we impose particular conditions which encode the desired state and
action models.
Cheating.
Consider the ’cheating’ scenario of the ﬁrst section where the set of agents
is A = {A,B,C}. Recall that there are two possibilities in the state model
Toss, s in which the coin is Heads up and t in which it is Tails up. We
model this abstractly by assuming as given an epistemic system (M,Q), with
s, t ∈ M and σH ∈ Q. The facts are encoded as stabilizers, i, e. we are given
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propositions H, T ∈ Stab(Q). All these are assumed to satisfy the following
conditions: fi(s) = fi(t) = s ∨ t for all i ∈ A s ≤ H, t ≤ T,H ∧ T = ⊥; the
epistemic program σH ∈ Q has maps fA(σH) = fB(σH) = 1 and fC(σH) = σH ,
and kernel Ker(σH) =↓ t. This program describes an instance of cheating
where the coin is heads up. s ⊗ σH ∈ M is the proposition s after it is
updated by σH .
Let us reason about this scenario, using our algebraic setting, e. to prove
that s ⊗ σH ≤ CH . Indeed by {fA}A∈A being system homomorphisms and
eq(1) we have
fA(s⊗ σH) ≤ fA(s)⊗ fA(σH) = (s ∨ t)⊗ 1 = s ∨ t ,
and the same goes for fB. On the other hand
fC(s⊗ σH) ≤ fC(s)⊗ fC(σH) = (s ∨ t)⊗ σH = (s⊗ σH) ∨ (t⊗ σH) = s⊗ σH
since t ∈ Ker(σH). We have s ≤ H iﬀ s⊗σH ≤ H ⊗σH and by the deﬁnition
of Stab(Q) we get s⊗ σH ≤ H . Thus fC(s⊗ σH) ≤ H and by adjunction we
get s ⊗ σH ≤ CH which means after updating his initial state by taking a
peek, the referee knows that the coin is heads up.
If the referee is honest he uncovers the coin without taking a peek. He
then publicly refutes the ‘coin being tails’. The epistemic program in this case
is the public refutation of proposition t where fA(q) = fB(q) = fC(q) = q
and Ker(q) = {t}. It follows that s ⊗ q ≤ AH , and the same goes for B
and C. Hence all the agents know that the coin is Heads up after the public
refutation.
The muddy children puzzle.
We refer the reader for a detailed description of the general case of the
muddy children puzzle to [9]. This general version has been encoded and as
usual solved by induction in our algebraic setting in [6]. In this paper we treat
the case of three children A,B,C playing in the mud with A and B having
muddy foreheads. Their father publicly announces that at least one of them
has mud on his forehead and asks once if they know that they are dirty. After
they all simultaneously reply “No!” once, the muddy children A and B will
know that they are muddy. This simple case has only one round (since the
number of dirty children is 2), but the general case with k dirty children shall
have k − 1 rounds of ”No!” replies.
As before, we model this by postulating as given an epistemic system
(M,Q). The set of agents A includes children {A,B,C}. The module M
includes all possible initial states sβ with β ⊆ A being those children that
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are dirty. Since the children cannot see their own foreheads (which might be
dirty or not) we have fMi (sβ) = sβ\{i} ∨ sβ∪{i} for each child i. Let D∅ be
the fact that no child has a dirty forehead and Di be the fact that child i
has a dirty forehead, hence {D∅} ∪ {Di ∈ M | i ∈ A} ⊆ Stab(Q), and also
sβ ≤ Di for all i ∈ β. Let q be a round of no answers of the 3 children, i.e.
q is the public refutation of ADA ∨ BDB ∨ CDC and hence Ker(q) =
ADA ∨BDB ∨CDC and fi(q) = q for each child i. Let q0 ∈ Q be the be
father’s announcement that at least one child has mud on his forehead hence
Ker(q0) =↓ D∅ and fi(q0) = q0 for each child i. We have to show that after the
ﬁrst round of refutation q each muddy child (e.g. A) knows that he is dirty, i.e.
s{A,B} ≤ [q0 • q]ADA and similarly for child B. By adjunction on dynamic
and epistemic modalities and module equation (m ⊗ q1)⊗ q2 = m ⊗ (q1 • q2)
we get
fA((s{A,B} ⊗ q0)⊗ q) ≤ DA . (2)
By the fA inequality (i.e. eq(1)) it suﬃces to show
fA(s{A,B} ⊗ q0)⊗ fA(q) ≤ DA
Again by eq(1) and the assumption fA(q0) = q0
fA(s{A,B} ⊗ q0) ≤ fA(s{A,B})⊗ q0
update both sides by fA(q) = q
fA(s{A,B} ⊗ q0)⊗ q ≤ (fA(s{A,B})⊗ q0)⊗ q
So to prove eq(2) it suﬃces to show
(fA(s{A,B})⊗ q0)⊗ q ≤ DA
Replacing fA by its value will get us
((s{A,B} ∨ s{B})⊗ q0)⊗ q ≤ DA
hence
((s{A,B} ⊗ q0)⊗ q) ∨ ((s{B} ⊗ q0)⊗ q) ≤ DA .
The ﬁrst disjunct is given by the assumptions s{A,B} ≤ DA and DA being a
fact and thus stable under updates, i.e. (DA ⊗ q0)⊗ q ≤ DA. For the other
disjunct we shall show that s{B} ⊗ q0 ≤ BDB ∈ Ker(q) which gives us
(s{B} ⊗ q0) ⊗ q = ⊥ and ⊥ ≤ DA. To see this use the adjunction to get
fB(s{B}⊗q0) ≤ DB, by eq(1) it suﬃces to show fB(s{B})⊗fB(q0) ≤ DB. Now
replace fB with its values and get (s{B} ∨ s{A,B})⊗ q0 ≤ DB which is equal to
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(s{B} ⊗ q0) ∨ (s{A,B} ⊗ q0) ≤ DB. This inequality holds since by assumption
s{B} ≤ DB and also s{A,B} ≤ DB. Hence the result follows.
Note that this proof can be straightforwardlly extended to the general case
by induction on the number of dirty children.
A cryptographic attack.
Two agents A and B share a secret key so that they can send each other
encrypted messages over some communication channel. The channel is not
secure: some outsider C may interpret the messages or prevent them from
being delivered (although he cannot read them because he does not have
the key). Suppose the encryption method is publicly known but the key is
secret. It is also known that A is the only one who knows an important
secret for example if some fact P holds or not. Suppose now that A sends an
encrypted message to B communicating the secret. B gets the message and he
is convinced that it must be authentic. Now both A and B are convinced that
they share the secret and that C doesn’t. However suppose that C notices
two features of the speciﬁc encryption method: ﬁrst that the shape of the
encrypted message can show whether it contains a secret or it is just junk,
second that without knowing the key or the content of the message he can
modify the encrypted message to its opposite i.e. if it originally said P hold, it
will now say that P does not hold. Now the outsider C will secretly intercept
the message, change it appropriately and send it to B without knowing the
secret. Now A and B mistakenly believe that they share the secret, while in
fact B got the wrong secret instead! C has succeeded to manipulate their
beliefs.
We can encode this situation in an epistemic system. The agents involved
include {A,B,C}. Let s, t ∈ M satisfy s ≤ P and t  P . The only agent that
knows if P holds or not is A thus fA(s) = s and similarly fA(t) = t. On the
other hand B and C do not know this so fB(s) = fC(s) = fB(t) = fC(t) = s∨t.
Call the message in which P holds P and the one in which it does not hold
P¯ . The epistemic actions that correspond to the cryptographic attack are the
following: α in which the message P is intercepted, modiﬁed and sent to B,
β in which the message P¯ is intercepted, modiﬁed and sent to B, α′ in which
A sends the message P to B, β ′ in which A sends the message P¯ to B, and
ﬁnally γ which corresponds to sending a junk message. Thus
{α, β, α′, β ′, γ} ⊆ Q and P, P¯ ∈ Stab(Q) and P ∧ P¯ = ⊥, P ∨ P¯ =  .
In actions α and β agent C is uncertain about which message P or P¯ has been
sent so fC(α) = fC(β) = α ∨ β. On the other hand, agent A is sure that he
has sent a message (either that P holds or that it doesn’t) to B and that B
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has received exactly the same secret i.e. fA(α) = α
′ and fA(β) = β
′. However
if P has been sent, B has received P¯ so fB(α) = β
′ and the other way around
fB(β) = α
′. Furthermore
fA(α
′) = fB(α
′) = α′ , fA(β
′) = fB(β
′) = β ′ , fC(α
′) = fC(β
′) = α′ ∨ β ′ ∨ γ .
C also considers possible that only a junk message has been sent and that is
why he sees γ while in α′ and β ′. If a junk message has been sent, A and B
are sure about it fA(γ) = fB(γ) = γ while C is unsure if it was a junk message
or P or P¯ , thus fC(γ) = α
′ ∨ β ′ ∨ γ. The kernel of each action is the states to
which the actions cannot be applied. Thus we encode
Ker(α) = Ker(α′) = ↓ P¯ and Ker(β) = Ker(β ′) = ↓P .
The epistemic program α∨β expresses the action of communicating the secret
P or P¯ in the above scenario. Now let us update the state s with the epistemic
program α ∨ β and show that after update, if P holds, then A knows that B
knows that P holds
s⊗ (α ∨ β) ≤ ABP .
Since this is equal to
(s⊗ α) ∨ (s⊗ β) ≤ ABP ,
and s ≤ P ∈ Ker(β), we get s⊗ β = ⊥, so it suﬃces to show that
s⊗ α ≤ ABP ,
but by adjunction fB(fA(s⊗ α)) ≤ P . By eq(1) we get fA(s⊗ α) ≤ fA(s)⊗
fA(α), order preservation of fB will give us
fB(fA(s⊗ α)) ≤ fB(fA(s)⊗ fA(α)) ≤ fB(fA(s))⊗ fB(fA(α)).
Now it suﬃces to show
fB(fA(s))⊗ fB(fA(α)) ≤ P.
Replace the fA with its values and show fB(s)⊗ fB(α
′) ≤ P , do the same for
fB and get (s ∨ t) ⊗ α
′ ≤ P , hence (s⊗ α′) ∨ (t ⊗ α′) ≤ P which is equal to
(s ⊗ α′) ≤ P since t ≤ P¯ ∈ Ker(α′). By the assumption s ≤ P we obtain
s⊗ α′ ≤ P ⊗ α′ which leads to s⊗ α′ ≤ P because P is a fact.
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A non-boolean example.
An intuitive example of an epistemic system (M,Q, fA)A∈A where refuta-
tions are ﬁrst class citizens rather than announcements is the refutation of
theories in scientiﬁc practice. Hence the underlying lattice M is naturally
non-boolean. Let the elements of the module M be theories written in some
logical language e.g. DEL; a theory being a consistent set of sentences closed
under logical deduction. For obvious reasons negating a theory th ∈ M is
in general itself not a theory — algebraically a theory should be conceived
as a ﬁlter. The join in M is the intersection of the sentences belonging to
the corresponding theories while the meet is the closure of their union. The
quantale Q consists of experiments performed by (groups of) agents in order
to check some testable consequences of theories. This experiment might be
public or private, and some of the outsiders might be deluded into rejecting,
misunderstanding or misinterpreting the outcome. 14 The appearance fMA (m)
of a theory to an agent can be thought of as the agent’s interpretation of the
theory m, and similarly the appearance fQA (q) is the agent’s interpretation of
the outcome of an experiment q. Following Popper’s conception, a positive
result of an experiment cannot provide a proof of a theory but a negative one
provides a falsiﬁcation of the theory, hence we can refute it. For each such
refutation r ∈ Q we have a kernel Ker(r) ∈ M which tells us which theories
can be refuted, namely those which satisfy th⊗ r = ⊥.
6 The sequent calculus of epistemic systems
We deﬁne the objects of our sequent calculus by mutual induction on two sets,
the set of formulas denoted as m ∈ LM and the set of epistemic programs
denoted as q ∈ LQ, respectively
m ::=⊥ |  | p | s | m ∧m | m ∨m | Am | fA(m) | [q]m | m⊗ q
q ::=⊥ | 1 | σ | q • q | q ∨ q | fA(q)
where A is in the set A of agents, p is in the set Φ of facts, s is in a set VM of
atomic propositional variables, and σ is in a set VQ of atomic action variables.
We denote by LM the set of all m-formulas, LQ the set of all q-formulas, and
A the set of agents. We have two kinds of sequents, M-sequents Γ M δ where
Γ ∈ (LM ∪LQ∪A)
∗ and δ ∈ LM , and Q-sequents Γ Q δ where Γ ∈ (LQ∪A)
∗
and δ ∈ LQ. To describe what these sequents mean, we extend the notation
to two operations
−− : LM × (LM ∪ LQ ∪ A) → LM and −− : LQ × (LQ ∪ A) → LQ
14 E.g. arguments for Darwinism such as the discovery of fossils are interpreted by creation-
ists as “the fossils have been put in place by God”.
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by putting q  q′ := q • q′, mA := fA(m), q A := fA(q), m q := m⊗ q,
and mm′ := m ∧m′. For a sequent
Γ = (γ1, · · · , γn) ∈ (LM ∪ LQ ∪A)
∗ ∪ (LQ ∪ A)
∗
we put
⊙
Γ := ((((	 γ1) γ2) γ3) · · · ) γn, where 	 is the top element of
M for M-sequents, and the unit element of Q for Q-sequents. 15 Obviously
we have
Γ ∈ (LM ∪ LQ ∪A)
∗ ⇒
⊙
Γ ∈ LM and Γ ∈ (LQ ∪A)
∗ ⇒
⊙
Γ ∈ LQ .
Deﬁne a satisfaction relation |= on LM as m |= m
′ ⇔ m ≤ m′ and similarly
on LQ as q |= q
′ ⇔ q ≤ q′. Now a sequent Γ  δ (for either M or Q) is
said to be valid iﬀ
⊙
Γ |= δ. We also allow sequents with empty consequents,
denoted as Γ  . We interpret such a sequent as being equivalent to Γ  ⊥,
or in other words
⊙
Γ = ⊥.
The meaning of a sequent.
The meaning of a sequent Γ  δ is given by its corresponding satisfaction
statement
⊙
Γ |= δ. To provide the reader with a way to “read out” our se-
quents in natural language, we capture the intuitive meaning of an M-sequent
(Q-sequents can be read in a similar way) Γ M δ in the following inductive
manner:
• A,Γ M δ means that agent A knows, or believes, that Γ M δ holds. So
this captures features of A’s own reasoning: the sequent Γ M δ is accepted
by A as a valid argument.
• q,Γ M δ means that, after action q happens, the sequent Γ M δ will hold.
• m,Γ M δ means that, in context m (i.e. in any situation in which m is
true), the sequent Γ M δ must hold.
For instance, the sequent m,A, q, B,m′ M m
′′ can be read as: in context
m, agent A believes that after action q agent B will believe that, in context
m′, proposition m′′ must hold .
This reading shows that our sequent calculus expresses two forms of re-
source sensitivity. One is the use-once form of linear logic [14] that comes from
the quantale structure on epistemic programs. This, as will be seen later, is
encoded in the Lambek calculus rules on Q-sequents. One could call these
dynamic resources . The other form deals with epistemic resources : the re-
sources available to each agent that enable him to reason in a certain way (i.e.
15 Note that the top element of M is the unit for
⊙
on M (i.e. ∧) and that the unit element
of Q (i.e. 1) is the unit for
⊙
on Q (i.e. •)
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to deduct a result from some assumptions). These resources are encoded in
the way the context appears to the agent in sequents, for instance Γ in the
sequent Γ, A,Γ′ M δ is the context and hence the fA(Γ) is the resource that
enables agent A to do the Γ′ M δ reasoning. Note that Γ
′ M δ might not
be a valid sequent in the context Γ, but it is valid in the context given by Γ’s
appearance to agent A. To summerize, in our setting not only propositions,
but also actions and agents are treated as resources (available or not for other
actions or for reasoning of other agents).
Sequent rules.
The rules for identity, ⊥, and 1 (on the left) are the same for both M and
Q sequents. So in the following we drop the subscripts of  where applicable:
⊥,Γ  δ (⊥L)
Γ 
Γ  ⊥ (⊥R) Γ M 
(R)
δ  δ (Id) Q 1
(1R)
Γ,Γ′  δ
Γ,1,Γ′  δ (1L)
The operational rules for M-sequents are
Γ,q M δ
Γ M [q]δ
([ ]R)
m,Γ M δ
[q]m,q,Γ M δ
([ ]L)
Γ,A M δ
Γ M Amδ
(R)
m,Γ M δ
Am,A,Γ M δ
(L)
Γ M δ
Γ,A M f
M
A (δ)
(fMA MR)
m,A,Γ M δ
fMA (m),Γ M δ
(fMA ML)
Γ,m,m′,Γ′ M δ
Γ,m∧m′,Γ′ M δ
(∧MML)
Γ Mδ Γ M δ
′
Γ M δ∧δ
′ (∧MMR)
Γ M δ
Γ M δ∨δ
′ (∨MR1)
Γ M δ
′
Γ M δ∨δ
′ (∨MR2)
m,Γ M δ m
′,Γ M δ
m∨m′,Γ M δ
(∨MML)
Γ,q,Γ′ M δ Γ,q
′,Γ′ M δ
Γ,q∨q′,Γ′ M δ
(∨QML)
Γ M δ
Γ,q M δ⊗q
(⊗R)
ΓM , q,Γ
′ M δ
ΓM ⊗ q,Γ
′ M δ
(⊗L)
Γ,q,q′,Γ′ M δ
Γ,q•q′,Γ′ M δ
(•ML)
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where ΓM ∈ L
∗
M , ΓQ ∈ L
∗
Q, ΓA ∈ A
∗, δ, δ′ ∈ LM and if ΓM = (m1, · · · , mn)
then ΓM ⊗ q := (m1 ⊗ q, · · · , mn ⊗ q).
The operational rules for Q-sequents consist of Lambek calculus rules
for ∨, plus the following rules for • and fA
ΓQ,ΓA Q δ Γ
′
Q,ΓA Q δ
′
ΓQ,Γ
′
Q,ΓA Q δ•δ
′ (•QR)
Γ,q1,q2,Γ
′ Q δ
Γ,q1•q2,Γ′ Q δ
(•QL)
Γ Q δ
Γ,A Q f
Q
A (δ)
(fQA QR)
ΓQ,A,Γ Q δ
f
Q
A (ΓQ),Γ Q δ
(fQA QL)
where δ, δ′ ∈ LQ and for ΓQ = (q1, q2, · · · ) , fA(ΓQ) = fA(q1) • fA(q2) • · · · .
As structural rules we have two M-Weakenings, Q-Weakening, M-Contraction,
and M-Exchange, respectively
Γ M δ
Γ′,Γ M δ
(weak1)
Γ,Γ′ M δ
Γ,m,Γ′ M δ
(weak2)
Γ Q δ
A,Γ Q δ
(weakA)
Γ,m,m,Γ′ M δ
Γ,m,Γ′ M δ
(contr)
Γ,m,m′,Γ′′ M δ
Γ,m′,m,Γ′′ M δ
(exch)
two rules expressing Invariance of facts (under epistemic actions) (rules which
can be seen as “ActionWeakening’ and “Action Strengthening” in M-sequents)
Γ M P
Γ,q M P
(fact1)
Γ,q M P
Γ M P
(fact2)
where P ∈ Φ (the set of facts), and ﬁnally several restricted versions of the Cut
Rule: propositional cut in M-sequents, action cut in Q sequents and action
cut in mixed M −Q sequents 16
Γ M m m,Γ
′ M δ
Γ,Γ′ M δ
(MCut)
Γ Q q q,Γ
′ Q δ
Γ,Γ′ Q δ
(QCut)
Γ,ΓA, q M δ ΓQ,ΓA Q q
Γ,ΓQ,ΓA M δ
(MQCut)
Theorem 6.1 (Completeness). The rules presented above are sound and
complete with regard to the algebraic semantics given by epistemic systems.
16 We think these cuts are eliminable and are working on the Cut-Elimination theorem.
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Proof (Sketch). Denote the equivalence relation created by logical conse-
quence  as ∼=. We construct two Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras: M0 of
equivalence classes of M-formulas over ∼=M and Q0 of equivalence classes of
Q-formulas over ∼=Q. Using the sequent rules we ﬁrst show that all the alge-
braic operations of epistemic systems ∨, fA,A,⊗, [ ], • are well-deﬁned over
equivalence classes of formulas. We then show that (M0, Q0, {fA}A∈A) satisﬁes
the ﬁnite versions of all the equations of an epistemic system. We embed this
structure into an epistemic system (M,Q, {fA}A∈A) by taking M = Idl(M0)
and Q = Idl(Q0) where e.g. Idl(M0) is the family of ideals over M0 with inclu-
sion as order and intersection as meet. The rest of operations ∨, fA,⊗, • are
extended to ideals by applying them pointwise and then taking the downward
closure. Finally we show that (M,Q, {fA}A∈A) forms an epistemic system and
that (M0, Q0, {fA}A∈A) is faithfully embedded in it. 
7 Conclusion and elaborations
We have developed an algebraic axiomatics in terms of a simple mathematical
object: a sup-lattice M , which encodes states, epistemic propositions as well
as facts; a quantale Q (acting on M) which encodes update by epistemic
programs; and a family of endomorphisms of the (M,Q,
∨
M ,
∨
Q,⊗, •, 1)-
structure encoding the agents in terms of their epistemic modalities. From
this structure many useful other modalities arise, including dynamic modali-
ties and residuals. This algebraic axiomatics generalizes Dynamic Epistemic
Logic to non-boolean settings, while still capturing the same concepts. Fur-
thermore it provides an algebraic way of dealing with epistemic scenarios such
as the muddy children puzzle. We list some possible further elaborations on
this line of thought.
• We would like to develop a boolean version of the sequent calculus presented
here for concrete epistemic systems and prove its completeness with regard
to Kripke semantics. Such a development will lead to a more reﬁned version
of our representation Theorem 4.6 for a boolean dynamic epistemic logic.
• In this paper, following dynamic epistemic logic, we dealt with the same
update schema for all agents. This is a postulate of “uniform rationality”
and it means that the mechanism for information update is the same for
all agents. It makes sense, if not being necessary, to consider personalized
updates, where each agent updates his information in a diﬀerent way than
other agents do. We think that such personalized updates could be better
dealt with by moving to a categorical semantics. We are currently working
on such semantics. It would also be interesting to compare our categorical
approach with coalgebraic epistemic features which are currently studied
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e.g. [3].
• Part of the motivation of this work was a marriage of epistemics and resource-
sensitivity [20]. Although we have introduced dynamic and epistemic re-
sources in our setting, we would like to reﬁne our logic and make it more
resource-sensitive by relativizing our notion of “consequence” to “logical”
actions available to agents. This will allow us to deal with classical resource
sensitive problems such as the problem of logical omniscience.
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